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Highlights
The warming of EU – Russia gas relations would be considerably beneficial to 
the EU, and is an achievable goal if a rational approach is adopted. Fundamen-
tal to this, is the acknowledgment of three essential issues. Firstly, EU – Russia 
gas relations cannot be considered independent of the bleak political context. 
Secondly, the EU will continue to need Russian gas for the foreseeable future. 
Thirdly, Russia’s dependence on the EU gas market is becoming much stronger 
than the EU’s energy reliance on Russian gas. Once these issues are acknowledged 
and accounted for, an improvement in EU – Russia gas relations is achievable 
and sustainable. It is only a matter of will to negotiate and create stable and viable 
proposals.  
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1. EU – Russia gas relations cannot be 
conceived independent of the bleak 
political context
To understand the EU – Russia gas relations, one has to 
accept a key reality: the relationship cannot be appraised 
independent of the wider political context. International 
gas production, supply and transportation are not con-
sidered as neutral and purely market-based activities, as 
demonstrated by the Ukraine and Russia gas crises in 2006 
and 2009. In both cases, Na ogaz and Gazprom’s inability 
to  nd acceptable pricing for gas deliveries and transit 
led to the con ict between Russia and Ukraine, and the 
resumption of gas deliveries to European consumers was 
only achieved following the political involvement of the 
EU. Other examples, including the debates surrounding 
the Nord Stream and the South Stream pipelines, demon-
strate the in uence of the wider political context on the 
gas relations between countries. As recently agreed by the 
EU’s foreign a airs ministers, one of the 5 guiding princi-
ples of the EU’s policy towards Russia explicitly mentions 
the strengthening of internal EU resilience, particularly 
in view of energy security. In terms of this security, gas 
supply is considered far more in uential than oil in deter-
mining the EU’s energy resilience.
Political relations between the EU and Russia have 
substantially deteriorated in the past 10 years and may 
struggle to improve in the coming decade, especially in 
light of the ongoing con ict in the east of Ukraine and the 
stalling of the implementation of the Minsk agreement. 
From the EU’s perspective, the full implementation of 
the Minsk agreement is seen as instrumental to a sub-
stantial change in relations with Russia. Regular meet-
ings between the ministers of foreign a airs of Ukraine, 
Russia, Germany and France have so far failed to improve 
the situation, as apparent with prolonged sanctions and 
the general sidestepping of the Crimea issue. 
Some progress has been achieved due to involvement 
in the Syrian con ict and, the cease re holding, Rus-
sia’s withdrawal of part of its troops and the beginning 
of meaningful talks to  nd a peaceful solution. And yet, 
there is a crucial divergence of opinions about postwar 
Syria. Furthermore, from a European perspective there 
are a several questions on the level of democracy, the 
human rights situation, and media freedom in Russia. In 
the EU, political trust in Russia has disappeared. Similarly, 
Russian trust in the EU has deteriorated. A good illustra-
tion is a recent article from Russia’s minister of foreign 
a airs Sergey Lavrov. Writing in the journal “Russia in 
Global A airs”, he reproaches Western leaders for mis-
leading the international community in a couple of cases, 
most recently in 2011 by forcing change in Libya. Lavrov 
makes the strong statement that, “uniting Europe without 
Russia and against Russia always ends with a tragedy”1.
Consideration of these wider political issues leads to the 
belief that the future of EU – Russia gas relations lies 
in a policy that is not based on trust, because no trust 
exists on any side of the EU – Russia political divide.  e 
Framework Strategy for a resilient Energy Union is quite 
clear in this respect, stating; “When the conditions are 
right, the EU will consider reframing the energy relation-
ship with Russia based on a level playing  eld in terms of 
market opening, fair competition, environmental protec-
tion and safety, for mutual bene ts of both sides”2.
 erefore, any improvement in EU – Russia gas relations 
has to emerge on the strength of its own merits, and be 
persuasive enough to circumvent the hostile political 
context.
Could this come from the current characteristics of the 
EU – Russia gas relations? Does the EU really need Rus-
sian gas? Does Russia really need the EU market? 
2.  e EU will continue to need Russian 
gas for the foreseeable future
Gas currently accounts for one quarter of the EU’s 
energy consumption and it is unlikely that the EU will 
stop consuming gas in the coming 15/20 years. In 2014, 
the demand for gas in the EU was estimated at 412 bil-
lion cubic metres (bcm) (with a rise of 7% in 2015).  e 
International Energy Agency expects that by 2035 the EU 
gas demand will have reached 550 bcm. A higher carbon 
price might favour greater usage of gas in power gen-
eration vis-à-vis coal and it is expected that the demand 
for gas will also increase in the transport sector. While 
energy e  ciency measures and the growth of the renew-
able energy share in the EU will reduce the use of fossil 
fuels in the EU, this is likely to have a more signi cant 
impact on reducing coal and lignite use, rather than gas. 
1.  Lavrov, Sergey, ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background’, Russia 
in Global A airs, March 3, 2016 
2. htt p://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2015%3
A80%3AFIN,25 February, 2015
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Even by 2050, around 10% of power generation could 
be still based on gas.  e process of phasing out nuclear 
power in some EU Member States might also be favour-
able for gas use in power generation.
 e EU produced less gas through domestic produc-
tion in 2015, as recorded at 140 bcm.  is production 
will gradually decrease to 55 - 90 bcm by 2035 and, with 
strong public opposition to the development of shale gas, 
it is likely to be closer to the lower estimate.  e EU may 
even reduce its own production faster than expected (as 
evident with the current low price for oil and gas fol-
lowing the North Sea retreat). 
 e EU is already the biggest gas importer in the world 
and the demand for gas imports will continue to grow, 
with the potential to reach the level of 450 bcm by 2035. 
 is could be a serious challenge for the EU. However, 
there is a good opportunity to attract more gas from dif-
ferent suppliers as the global supply of LNG (lique ed 
natural gas) is increasing and there are some forecasts of a 
weakening demand for gas in Asia.  e EU’s gas market is 
also more attractive following the implementation of the 
third internal energy market package, and investments 
in the interconnections and reverse  ow capacities.  e 
European Commission’s recently proposed revised Secu-
rity of Gas Supply Regulation3 will further strengthen 
the robustness and the transparency of the internal gas 
market.
To date, there is still no reliable alternative source of 
gas which could displace the Russian gas supply in a 
market-based competition due to the unparalleled cost 
advantages they o er.  e OIES paper “ e Political and 
Commercial Dynamics of Russia’s Gas Export Strategy”4 
estimates the cost of supply for both Russian pipeline 
exports and future US LNG exports.  eir analysis con-
cludes that; “While on some levels Gazprom’s gas can be 
seen as much cheaper, if both are compared on a short-run 
marginal cost basis then the di erence is much smaller… 
Gazprom would have to price its gas at the very bottom end 
of its marginal cost range”.
3. htt p://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0053, 
16 February 2016
4.  Henderson, James; Mitrova, Tatiana, “ e Political and Commercial 
Dynamics of Russia’s Gas Export Strategy’,  e Oxford Institute for En-
ergy Studies, September 2015 (htt ps://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NG-102.pdf)
3. Russia’s reliance on the EU gas market 
is much stronger than the EU energy 
dependency on Russian gas
Russia does not have any credible alternative to the EU 
market for its gas. In 2015, Gazprom exports to Europe 
(including Turkey and the Energy Community countries) 
reached nearly 160 bcm, an increase of 8% compared with 
2014.  is quantity is beginning to reach the volume of 
sales in Russia itself, where Gazprom delivered 205 bcm. 
Reporting on Gazprom’s results in 2015 to Russia’s Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin, newly reappointed CEO Alexey 
Miller placed a particular emphasis on the increase of 
gas sales in EU countries. In his public statements, Miller 
has made assertions such as, “we can double exports to 
Europe” and “we can cover whatever demand”, which 
have been supported by President Putin’s announcement 
of plans to increase gas production in Russia by 40% by 
2035. With Russian domestic demand being  at, this 
increase is expected to cover export demand. Russia, as 
a gas exporter to the EU, faces three main challenges: the 
transit risks, the increased competition related to the EU’s 
gas supply diversi cation and the EU’s gas market liberal-
isation with a request for an unbundling between the dif-
ferent activities. Russia’s attempts to diversify its markets 
have produced limited results. In 2015, an agreement was 
made with China for the export of 38 bcm yearly for 30 
years, starting from 2020, through the “Sila Sibiri” pipe-
line, the construction of which is yet to be completed. An 
estimated $70 billion investment is needed for the con-
struction of the pipeline and the development of two gas 
 elds in Eastern Siberia.  e current gas price levels are 
not conducive to this investment. And, attempts to agree 
on supply through the Altai route from the already devel-
oped gas  elds in Western Siberia so far have not been 
successful. 
Gazprom has its own growing competitors inside Russia, 
particularly Rosne  and Novatek.  e Gazprom export 
monopoly has been changed and liberalisation of LNG 
exports has taken place. By 2017, Novatek could be 
the second of Russia’s gas companies to join the world 
market (a er Gazprom) while Yamal LNG could also 
supply gas to the EU market. While Rosne  projects are 
largely behind schedule and mostly target Asian markets, 
it has won a landmark case against Gazprom in relation 
to third party access to the “Sakhalin-2” pipeline and is 
developing an o shore gas  eld in Vietnam. Each of these 
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examples demonstrates how Russia’s gas sector continues 
to change, with an increasing number of companies 
looking for new markets.
 e repeated gas pipeline building proposals by Russia 
and Gazprom (South Stream; Turkish Stream; Poseidon; 
Nord Stream 2) have to be seen as giving clear signals and 
further evidence that maintaining the  ow of gas to the 
EU is really vital for Russia.  e current capacity of all gas 
pipelines towards the European Union stands at nearly 
250 bcm, which is already 90 bcm more than the current 
demand from Europe.  e last two projects (namely: Nord 
Stream 2 and Turkish Stream) would add an additional 
118 bcm in transit capacity. It would increase the overall 
capacity to nearly 370 bcm, a capacity that will never be 
fully used. Both of these recent projects are capital inten-
sive and politically sensitive with sanctions making the 
 nancing of these projects more challenging. It has even 
been suggested that a €2 billion loan that Gazprom has 
agreed with the Bank of China could be used to  nance 
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project.  e fact that Gazprom 
recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the Italian Edison and the Greek DEPA about the supply 
of gas from Russia under the Black Sea, also provides an 
indirect statement that, despite complicated political rela-
tions with Turkey, the Turkish Stream concept continues 
to be a priority for Gazprom. 
Conclusion
 e EU – Russia gas relations could move “out of the cold”, 
not because gas is not a politicised matter, but because 
these gas relations have their own solid strength. 
On the one hand, the EU will continue to need Russian 
gas for the foreseeable future. 
On the other hand, Russia has no credible substitute for 
the EU market: as a result, its reliance on EU gas con-
sumers is far greater than the EU’s dependence on Rus-
sian supply. Even if Russia’s preference is to continue 
its gas export policy based on long- term contracts, 
including the “take or pay” principle, and keeping prices 
analogous to the oil price, Russia has shown some  ex-
ibility, through the use of gas auctions.
In such a framework, one can conclude that improve-
ments to EU – Russia relations could be made. It is only a 
matter of will to negotiate and to create durable and reli-
able proposals. 
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